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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
V •

I

JAMES LOUIS HOLLAND,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870410

Category No. 1

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This is an automatic review of a conviction of capital
homicide in the Third District Court.

This Court has

jurisdiction to review this case under Utah Code Ann. § 77-3526(10) (Supp. 1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Should this Court consider the issues raised by

defense counsel on appeal where none of them are manifest
prejudicial errors, or even error at allf and where defendant has
stated he does not want to appeal?
2.

Does S 76-5-202(1)(h) violate the double jeopardy

clause by enhancing the punishment for murder from second degree
to first degree murder with the aggravating circumstance that the
defendant was previously convicted of first or second degree
murder prior to committing the instant offense?
3.

Did the trial court correctly find defendant competent

to proceed with the penalty hearing where defendant refused to
participate in further evaluation of his competency and where the
psychologist merely stated a conclusion that defendant

was incompetent supported only by unexplained psychological labels?
4,

Did the court abuse its discretion by imposing the

death penalty on the defendant in the face of aggravating
evidence that outweighed the mitigating evidence and evidence
that the death penalty was appropriate based upon the nature of
the crime, defendant's background and character and propensity to
commit future crimes of violence?
5.

Is Utah's death penalty constitutional?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with first degree murder, a
capital felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h)
(Supp.1987), and two counts of theft, second and third degree
felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).

After

a preliminary hearing on August 18, 1987, defendant pled guilty
to first degree murder on September 1, 1987 before Judge Homer F.
Wilkinson in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County.
The court dismissed both counts of theft on the State's motion.
Defendant waived his right to a jury for the penalty phase
hearing which occurred on September 17, 1987. Judge Wilkinson
sentenced defendant to death by lethal injection on September 30,
1987.
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traffic lane where it was parked (P.T. 31) . Before he left the
scene, defendant cleaned the shattered glass from the car,
removed some blankets from the front seat that might have blood
on them and took Patt's wallet containing $250-350 (P.T. 20, 3132).
Travelling on to Pueblo, Colorado, defendant threw
Patt's wallet from the car in Wyoming (P.T. 21, 32-33).
Defendant abandoned Patt's car in Pueblo and was eventually
apprehended in Florida (P.T. 21, 24). While travelling back to
Utah from Florida, defendant confessed these facts to Summit
County Sheriff's Detective Joseph Offret (P.T. 16, 25).
Defendant displayed no remorse for his crime (P.T. 33) .
Further facts, including the aggravating and mitigating
evidence that was introduced at the penalty phase, are developed
below in relevant portions of the argument.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should not consider the issues raised by
defense counsel but should follow Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(10)
and review the record for manifest, prejudicial error because
defendant does not want an appeal.
Defendant is not twice placed in jeopardy for a
previous murder where this conviction for first degree murder
relies on that previous murder as an aggravating circumstance.
By using the previous murder to aggravate an intentional and
knowing murder to first degree murder, the Legislature is merely
recognizing the long accepted practice of treating repeat

-4-

punishment

i.

:• •

P^
(J'bV

,.*,,.

r^f

f^n I r f n t

r P f USe 1

f

>DO I a M

*

I * T *• T

Il IIU'l IJi

/

decided

(

counsel

requeste-

. oceed

*
* * > nuance

*.:

ntJi

*

f

.< -

..i

- ^ . i» i t . i s e

> t - * r f. i i j a t : > *

, IN'III

continuance f sua sponte, a m ;
testimony shed
ne\

• i:^*

. *»e-,<at*a it- . iiie

-- >^.>e of

De* a .ot r.s

un.pftpncf-.

:

* ~i> a

er relate :i IIi

the appropr iate legal standard t: hat defendant must appreciate : r
natuie ui

tne ptoceedings and the punishment and be able ^w uid

his attorney.
Based

..* •

• avjjr avdt i: -

** *

* * a' were

;;i»"* * reiatir

deft .iai i \-

J.O*<.

tr;t:.

ippropr iate. v . r.^t t ,v

a in

1:cumstances

JI -

I n i l l ni I in ni I

-

^iv.pu*^;,) Low.*

111 I i ' i n III mi i Hi i 111 n
i

4 ,ifnre

:*.;•

i 11 ni ni ni ni ni i ni 1 1 I i I

u

\- . ,ence f thp

penult
«f I i f 1 1

I

efeniant
in I

- u

exhibits no remorse foi Ins i i i^es wlin.:l all ait: tin. result
the wuild outside ui pr^j.-1 .

his

"*t-o*

. '

penalty W J :

This Court has previ 01 is] y considered claims that the
Utah death penalty
s u b e (, iii mi ni i ni in ni ni (

Court

should

mi mi i

again

i* unconstitutional.
i mill

in

uphold

i in I M I I

IHIII I I 1 III

( lie i l i ' d t h

III

Defendant * < claim? are
m ( i 11 III

p e n a l Mi

11 i c i m i m 11111111

1 111 1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW PROVISION DOES NOT
CONTEMPLATE BRIEFING OF ISSUES FRAMED BY
DEFENSE COUNSEL WHERE DEFENDANT DESIRES NO
APPEAL, THUS, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CLAIMS BUT SHOULD REVIEW
THE RECORD FOR MANIFEST, PREJUDICIAL ERROR
ONLY.
Defendant in this case has expressed his desire to this
Court and to the State that he does not wish to appeal his death
sentence.

See Appendix A.

This Court, nevertheless, ordered

defense counsel to submit an appellant's brief.

The State urges

this Court to reconsider its ruling on the grounds that Utah Code
Ann. § 77-35-26(10) (Supp. 1987) which provides that "Ii]n
capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, and
the defendant has chosen not to pursue his own appeal, the case
shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . ,"
does not require such briefing and because the order is contrary
to defendant's wishes and defense counsel's duty to represent his
client in the manner in which the client desires to be
represented.
In ordering defense counsel to brief this case, this
Court required essentially that counsel create issues for appeal
where defendant desired no appeal.

None of the issues raised by

counsel are manifest, prejudicial error.

Where defendant does

not desire an appeal, and wishes therefore to raise n£ issues,
this Court should merely review the record for manifest,
prejudicial error.

See State v. Tillman, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7

(Dec. 22, 1987) (court will review record in capital case for
manifest, prejudicial error not preserved by defendant).
-6-
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POINT J I
SECTION 76-5-202(1) (h) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE BY PUNISHING DEFENDANT "
TWICE FOR PRIOR MURDERS
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previously convicted of first or second degree murder.

He

suggests that this scheme is more than mere enhancement of the
punishment for the present murder conviction, but punishes him
twice for the previous murder simply because the previous murder
conviction is an element of the crime which the State must prove
at the guilt phase of the trial.

Thus, he attempts to

distinguish §76-5-202(1) (h) from habitual criminal statutes which
have been upheld against similar attacks and concludes that
defendant should have been convicted of second degree murder
because the use of his prior murder conviction to aggravate this
murder is unconstitutional.

Defendant's reasoning is flawed.

As stated by the Supreme Court, "the propriety of
inflicting severer punishment upon old offenders has long been
recognized in this country and in England.

They are not punished

the second time for the earlier offense, but the repetition of
criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier
penalties when they are again convicted."
Virginia. 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912).

Graham v. West

The Court reaffirmed this

principle in Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937) (increased
degree of crime of escape depending on degree of crime for which
defendant serving time when escaped not double jeopardy
violation), and in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).

Based

upon this reasoning, the Alabama Supreme Court held that there
was no double jeopardy violation in its first degree murder
statute including as an element of the crime a prior conviction
for murder.

Arthur v. State, 472 So. 2d 650 (Ala Cr. App. 1985),

overruled on other grounds, 472 So. 2d 665 (Ala. 1985).

-8-

The effect of including as an element of first degree
murder a prior conviction for murder is increased punishment.
Removing this as an element of the crime and creating another
statutory scheme whereby this aggravating circumstance would not
apply until the penalty phase would serve no real distinguishing
purpose in the context of double jeopardy analysis and defendant
presents no convincing argument to the contrary.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND DEFENDANT
COMPETENT TO PROCEED WITH THE PENALTY
PHASE OF THE TRIAL,
On appeal defense counsel argues that defendant should
have received a continuance to present further evidence on the
issue of his competence to proceed with the penalty phase of the
trial.

Counsel claims that the trial judge abused his discretion

in proceeding to the penalty phase in the face of the
psychologists request for more time to evaluate defendant.

This

claim lacks merit because defendant himself refused to cooperate
with such an evaluation and there was no convincing evidence that
defendant was incompetent to proceed.
At the beginning of the penalty phase hearing, defense
counsel asked for a continuance so that Dr. Michael Decaria could
have more time to evaluate defendant in light of unspecified
information that had come to light as late as the day before the
bearing (P.T. 3,8). The State agreed to the continuance,
however, defendant himself opposed the continuance and stated
that he would not speak to Dr. Decaria any further (P.T. 4-5, 7,

-9-

9-10) • In light of defendant's statements that he wanted to
proceed with the hearing and that he would not cooperate with
psychological evaluations, the trial court properly decided to
proceed with the hearing as scheduled.

This is especially true

where defense counsel did not specify precisely what it was that
concerned him about Dr. Decaria's state of preparedness.

Nor did

defense counsel specifically state that he was concerned about
defendant's competency to proceed but only that Dr. Decaria
wanted to evaluate defendant further for purposes of the penalty
hearing.
While it is true that Dr. Decaria stated that he did
not feel defendant was competent to plead guilty when he
testified later in the penalty hearing,

his opinion was not

sufficiently supported by reasoning based upon his evaluation of
defendant.

As occurred in State v. Lafferty, 73 Utah Adv. Rep.

57, 58-59 (Jan. 11, 1988), Dr. Decaria simply tagged defendant
with a mental disorder, clinical depression, but did not explain
how this disorder prevented him from understanding the nature of
the proceedings and potential punishment or from assisting his
attorney in his defense. And see Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2
(1982). He stated that though defendant did not want to die, his
decision to proceed with the penalty hearing instead of
continuing it indicated he was not competent to proceed (P.T.
161-162).
Because Dr. Decaria simply tagged defendant with a
psychological label without explaining how this mental disorder
affected his ability to understand the proceedings and aid his

-10-

attorney, and also acknowledged that defendant understood the
nature of the proceedings (P.T. 161), the trial court did not
err in failing to continue the hearing after Dr. Decaria

testified.2 fcafferty# 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 59; Carter v. United
££jjL£££, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Campbell v. United
States. 307 F.2d 597, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J.
dissenting).

Dr. Decaria merely expressed his conclusion that

defendant was incompetent without explaining how he reached that
conclusion; thus, the judge was free to reject Dr. Decaria's
opinion.

Lafferty, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 60.
The Court could also properly have rejected Dr.

Decaria's opinion that defendant was incompetent because Dr.
Decaria admitted that he had performed no psychological tests on
defendant and had spent a total of only three and one half hours
evaluating defendant (P.T. 165). Moreover, Dr. Decaria admitted
that he is philosophically opposed to the death penalty, that
most of his income results from being employed as a defense
expert in death penalty cases and that he was retained by the
defense for six out of nine capital cases to be tried that fall
(P.T. 163-164).

The court could properly have concluded that Dr.

Decaria's opinion that defendant was incompetent was clouded by
his philosophical opposition to the death penalty since Dr.
Decaria worded his opinion in a manner that suggested that he
* While defendant did not ask the Court for a continuance after
Dr. Dacaria testified, counsel's argument on appeal suggests that
the court should have granted such a continuance, presumably sua
sponte. In light of State v. Tillman, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7
(Dec. 22, 1987), this Court should reverse the trial court only
if there was manifest, prejudicial error.
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felt that anyone who acquiesced to the death penalty was
incompetent (See P.T. 161-62).

Howeverf as the Supreme Court has

stated:
The idea that the deliberate decision of one
under sentence of death to abandon possible
additional legal avenues of attack on that
sentence cannot be a rational decision,
regardless of its motive, suggests that the
preservation of one's own life at whatever
cost is the summum bonum, a proposition with
respect to which the greatest philosophers
and theologians have not agreed and with
respect to which the United States Constitution by its terms does not speak.
Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1310, 1312-14 (1979).
It is also true that defendant testified during the
hearing that he would participate in therapy with Dr. Decaria if
he received a life sentence (P.T. 105). This testimony, however,
is not inconsistent with his refusal to participate in further
evaluation that would delay the penalty hearing.

It did not

demonstrate that he had changed his mind on this point and
determined to cooperate in an attempt to delay the hearing since
defense counsel asked him about therapy that would occur only if
defendant received a life sentence.

Consequently, there was no

basis for the court to assume that defendant would cooperate with
an evaluation before it imposed the sentence.

-12-

POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON DEFENDANT.
Defense counsel asserts that defendant should not have
received the death penalty because it is not an appropriate
punishment in the circumstances of this crime.

He claims that

defendant was guilty at most of manslaughter or second degree
murder, that he suffered from a psychological disorder and was
not competent to proceed.

The substance of both of these claims

is addressed in the preceding Points I and II.
It is appropriate to point outf however, that the facts
of defendant's crime support the sentence of death.

The evidence

reveals that defendant shot Sam Patt at very close range because
Mr. Patt decided to expel defendant from his car and defendant
did not want to get out of the car.
Patt's wallet and car.

Defendant then took Mr.

Defendant expressed no remorse for his crime.

Further, defendant was previously convicted of robbery
with a firearm in Florida on July 22, 1987 and murder in Iowa on
October 29, 1964, and had murdered Karl Behm at the rest stop
where he met Mr. Patt (P.T. 43-55, 63). Defendant shot the Iowa
man because the man wanted him to go swimming and defendant did
not want to go swimming.

Defendant shot Mr. Behm in the chest

while he slept in his parked car because Mr. Behm said defendant
was a bum (P.T. 60-62) • Defendant said that he would have killed
at least four other people at the rest stop but they left before
he had an opportunity to shoot them (P.T. 60-61) . Defendant was
not remorseful for this murder either, stating that Behm got what
he deserved for calling defendant a bum (P.T. 63).
-13-

In mitigation, defendant offered little evidence.

He

testified that he had a deprived childhood, spending most of his
life from the age of nine in reform school and prison (P.T. 7588# 93). He claimed that he was ridiculed in reform school and
beaten in prison (P.T. 76, 78, 81). He further claimed that his
Iowa murder trial was unfair because he was unable to introduce
evidence that his victim was a child molester who may have been
attempting to sodomize defendant when he insisted that defendant
go swimming with him (P.T. 84-85, 87). Defendant was 24 years
old at the time (P.T. 82-83).
Much of defendant's own testimony supported the court's
finding that the death penalty was appropriate.

When he was

released from prison in 1985, defendant said he felt lost because
all of his friends were in prison, that he did stupid things
trying to get caught and returned to prison, and that he felt
better in prison than outside (P.T. 89, 92). He also stated
several times that sometimes he just gets mad and if he does not
stop himself before something happens, he blows up and might do
anything but that he can control this by leaving before something
happens (P.T. 91, 96, 98). He did not know why he did not just
get out of the car and avoid trouble when Mr. Patt told him to
get out even though he felt that something might happen before it
actually did (P.T. 128). Defendant said he is able to control
hie temper in prison and has never hurt anyone in prison because
he feels comfortable there but on the outside, people just laugh
at him and ridicule him (P.T. 101, 105-106).

He also admitted,

however, that he had been convicted of escape about three times
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and of possession of a weapon while in prison (P.T. 107-108) . He
speculated that it was possible that he might get mad and hurt
someone in prison because he never knows what he might do from
one minute to the next and because he anticipated having a weapon
in the prison if sent there (P.T. 131)•
Defendant said that he always carries a gun outside of
prison and that he had several different weapons at different
times including a .32, a .38, a .357, and a .45 even though he
knows as a parolee he is not allowed to carry a firearm (P.T.
114, 123). He admitted that he committed several armed robberies
during 1987 (P.T. 123-126, 129).
Dr. Michael Decaria, a clinical psychologist, testified
in mitigation that defendant never developed a moral conscience
and that he suffered from depression (P.T. 135, 144, 153, 156).
Defendant knows what society considers to be right and wrong, but
he does not feel guilt over transgressions (P.T. 145). In Dr.
Decaria's opinion, defendant is not capable of functioning
outside of prison but can function within prison (P.T. 152).
When he killed Sam Patt, defendant was overwhelmed with a
primitive urge to protect himself from being put out into the
cold according to Dr. Decaria (P.T. 155-156) and defendant's
depression contributed to commission of the crime (P.T. 158).
Dr. Decaria felt, however, that defendant would continue to
commit crimes if outside of prison (P.T. 159).
Based upon the aggravating circumstances of the crime
and defendant's propensity to commit other violent crimes and the
fact that defendant felt no remorse for his crimes, the trial
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court appropriately chose the death penalty.

Defendant's claim

that he was guilty at most of second degree murder or
manslaughter is unsupported by the facts adduced from his own
confession and testimony at the penalty hearing.
POINT V
UTAH'S DEATH PENALTY IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
In Points IV, V, VI, VII and VIII of his brief, defense
counsel asserts that Utah's death penalty is unconstitutional for
several reasons.

These claims were previously disposed of by

this Court in State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 19 (filed
Feb. 3, 1988).

Bishop holds that the death penalty is

constitutional in the face of challenges that it is cruel and
unusual punishment, that it violates principles of due process
and equal protection, that the sentencing authority is allowed
too much discretion in determining the appropriate penalty absent
instructions on how to consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, that the statutory scheme shifts the burden of
proof to the defendant in the penalty phase and that there is
inadequate review by this Court because there are no written
findings of the aggravation and mitigation.

Counsel's current

claims of unconstitutionality, though possibly articulated
differently, are similar in substance to those recently
reconsidered by this Court in Bishop and, under the reasoning of
the cases referred to in Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, n. 65, this
Court should again uphold the Utah death penalty.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm defendant's death sentence and find that the Utah death
penalty is constitutional,
RESPECTFULLY, submitted this I2ih

day of April, 1988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

>Qt?:<^v
SANDRA L. -ATDGREN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this '^/'l day of April, 1988,
four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to Elliott Levine,
Attorney for Appellant, 4168 South 1785 West, West Valley City,
Utah 84119.

^2>rm
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January 21, 1987

Mr, Janes L. Holland
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Re: State v. Holland;

No. 870410

Dear Mr. Holland:
In response to your letter dated January 5, 1988,
please find enclosed a photo copy of a state statute which
mandates an "automatic appeal" by the Utah Supreme Court in
a capital felony case.
I comprehend your statement that you have not
authorized an appeal, but your court appointed attorney Ilr.
Elliot Levine really has no choice.
The Supreme Court has instructed Mr. Levine to
comply with U.C.A. 76-3-206(2) and to prepare the review in
the normal appellate manner.
This explains why Mr. Levine is proceeding without
your expressed consent.
Very trul^ yours,,
,•—\.

Geoffjrey J . B u t l e r
Clerk
'
Enc:
cc: Elliott Levine

